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Abstract: Mathematical epidemiology, one of the oldest and richest areas in mathematical biology, has sig-
nificantly enhanced our understanding of how pathogens emerge, evolve, and spread. Classical epidemiological
models, the standard for predicting and managing the spread of infectious disease, assume that contacts
between susceptible and infectious individuals depend on their relative frequency in the population. The
behavioral factors that underpin contact rates are not generally addressed. There is, however, an emerging a
class of models that addresses the feedbacks between infectious disease dynamics and the behavioral decisions
driving host contact. Referred to as ‘‘economic epidemiology’’ or ‘‘epidemiological economics,’’ the approach
explores the determinants of decisions about the number and type of contacts made by individuals, using
insights and methods from economics. We show how the approach has the potential both to improve pre-
dictions of the course of infectious disease, and to support development of novel approaches to infectious
disease management.
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ECONOMIC EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
Economic behavior is known to play a key role in disease
transmission. Throughout history, new pathogens have
emerged with the opening of new markets or trade routes.
The Black Death in the fourteenth century, and the sixteenth
century Columbian exchange—which brought smallpox and
typhus to the Americas, and syphilis to Europe, are the best-
known examples (McNeill 1977; Yoo et al. 2010). In the last
few decades, the growth of global trade and travel have been
implicated in the emergence of human infectious diseases
such as plague, cholera, HIV (Tatem et al. 2006a, b), West
Nile virus (Lanciotti et al. 2000), SARS (Guan et al. 2003;
Hufnagel et al. 2004), as well as livestock diseases such as
H9N2 Avian influenza, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy,
Bluetongue or Foot and Mouth disease (Rweyemamu and
Astudillo 2002; Karesh et al. 2005; Fevre et al. 2006; Purse
et al. 2008), and diseases of wildlife—potentially white-nose
syndrome in bats (Pikula et al. 2012). In the USA, many other
wildlife diseases and zoonoses have been linked to live animal
imports (Smith et al. 2009a). Trade and travel affect the
likelihood that pathogens are spread internationally by
altering the number and variety of infectious-susceptible
contacts (Smith et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2008; Suhrcke et al.
2011; Daszak 2012; Kilpatrick and Randolph 2012). In the
same way, the decisions people make to engage with others in
their own community affect the spread of disease nationally.
Since people take account of potential disease risks, it is
possible to analyze the spread of disease as a function of the
costs and benefits of disease risk management.
In recent years, work at the boundary between ecology,
epidemiology, and economics has shed new light on the
way that economic behavior affects the spread of pests and
pathogens (reviewed in Perrings 2014). The approach, re-
ferred to either as economic epidemiology or as epidemi-
ological economics (hereafter EE), initially focused on the
relationship between preventive behavior and disease
prevalence (Philipson 2000). More recently, it has focused
on the economic causes and epidemiological consequences
of the number and type of contacts people make (Gersovitz
and Hammer 2003, 2004; Barrett and Hoel 2007; Funk et al.
2009; Funk et al. 2010; Springborn et al. 2010). That is, the
economic factors behind contact and mixing decisions are
treated as part of the disease transmission mechanism. The
approach provides a deeper understanding of the dynamics
of epidemics, and opens up a new set of disease manage-
ment options that target either the contact rate (Kremer
1996; Auld 2003) or the probability that contact leads to
infection (Geoffard and Philipson 1996).
EE models extend classic compartmental epidemio-
logical models that divide the population into compart-
ments defined by health and demographic status. The
classic models focus on the basic reproductive ratio of the
disease, R0—the number of secondary cases in a naı¨ve,
wholly susceptible, and disease-free population that result
from the initial introduction of pathogen (Kermack and
Mckendrick 1929; Anderson and May 1979, 1991). In the
simplest models, R0 is the product of three factors: the
contact rate, the conditional probability of transmission per
contact, and the duration of the infectious period. It is used
to indicate whether or not the infection prevalence will
increase or decrease. When R0 > 1 the pathogen may
spread, when R0 < 1 it will not. The basic reproductive
ratio, or variants such as the effective reproduction number
(which measures transmission in a population that may be
only partially susceptible) and the control reproduction
number (which measures transmission in a susceptible
population with control measures in place), are then used
to inform disease management (Brauer and Castillo-Chavez
2013). The EE approach treats the reproduction number as
a function of the decisions that underpin contact between
susceptible and infected individuals. It thus opens up a
different set of management options.
The EE approach is ultimately grounded in bioeco-
nomic models of renewable resource management (Clark
1973, 1976, 1979). EE models focus on the optimal disease
avoidance strategy and how that feeds back into the spread
of infectious diseases of people (Geoffard and Philipson
1996; Kremer 1996; Auld 2003; Francis 2008) and animals
(Horan and Wolf 2005; Horan et al. 2010, 2011). The
approach also considers the consequences of disease risk
management for economic development (Barrett and Hoel
2007) and growth (Grossman 1972; Boucekkine and Laff-
argue 2010; Chakraborty et al. 2010). In what follows, we
focus on two risk management strategies—contact reduc-
tion and selective mixing. However, we note that consid-
erable attention has also been paid to vaccination (Francis
1997, 2004; Boulier et al. 2007; Cook et al. 2009).
A common feature of EE models is that behavior af-
fects, and is affected by, the disease risks involved in both
contact and mixing decisions (Fenichel et al. 2011; Aadland
et al. 2013; Fenichel and Wang 2013; Morin et al. 2013).
While the term risk is used in many non-economic appli-
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cations to denote the probability of an undesirable or bad
outcome, we use the term risk to denote the product of the
probability and the value of the bad outcome. It is an ex-
pected cost. Hence, disease risk is the probability of infec-
tion multiplied by the cost of infection. There is a
considerable literature on the impact of disease risk, in the
expected cost sense, on behavior (Francis 1997; Auld 2003;
Chen 2004; Del Valle et al. 2005; Bootsma and Ferguson
2007; Klein et al. 2007; Chen 2009; Funk et al. 2009; Reluga
2010; Chen et al. 2011; Gersovitz 2011), at least some of
which is empirically based (Caley et al. 2008; Gersovitz
2011; Fenichel et al. 2013). The evidence suggests that the
expected cost of disease, or at least the part of cost that is
carried directly by decision-makers, is weighed amongst the
benefits and costs of contact and mixing decisions. An
improved understanding of how these behavioral responses
feed back into infectious disease dynamics strengthens
capacity to predict the course of epidemics (Bauch and
Earn 2004; Reluga 2010; Perra et al. 2011; Fenichel and
Wang 2013).
Beyond improved prediction, the EE approach has the
potential to reduce the social cost of disease management
relative to classical approaches. Specifically, it allows public
health authorities to go beyond traditional control methods
such as vaccination, treatment, or social distancing, and to
use economic incentives that change the course of epi-
demics by changing private contact and mixing decisions
(Francis 2004; Chowell et al. 2009a; Fenichel 2013). In this
paper, we review the development of the EE approach, and
show how it is creating new options for the way epidemics
are evaluated and managed.
THE BASIC STRUCTURE AND RESULTS OF EE
MODELS
It is useful to distinguish between the private decision
problem (the decision-problem facing susceptible and
infectious individuals, or those trading potentially infected
animals or animal products) and the social decision-
problem (the decision-problem facing public health or
sanitary authorities). The main elements of both problems
are an objective function describing the decision-maker’s
goals, a constraint set describing the dynamics of the system
being managed, a control or choice set—the mechanisms
by which the decision-maker is able to influence those
dynamics, and the feedback loops that link these compo-
nents.
To illustrate the EE approach, consider the private
decision-problem faced by susceptible individuals seeking
to manage the risks of an infectious disease of humans. Let
the disease dynamics be described by a three-compartment
(susceptible, infected and infectious, and recovered) dis-
crete time S, I, R model:
Stþ1  St ¼ Cðwct; St ; It ; RtÞbðwht; HtÞStPðwmt; St ; It ; MSIt Þ
Itþ1  It ¼ Cðwct; St ; It ; RtÞbðwht; HtÞStPðwmt; St ; It ; MSIt Þ  Itm;
Rtþ1  Rt ¼ Itm
wct, wht, and wmt denote the costs of contact, Ct, prophy-
lactic measures, Ht, and mixing decisions, Mt
SI. The func-
tion C() is the rate at which susceptible individuals make
contact with others within the population, b() is the
probability that an infectious contact results in infection,
P() is the conditional probability that a susceptible person
will encounter an infected person—the outcome of sus-
ceptible individuals’ mixing choices, and v is the recovery
rate. In the simplest epidemiological models, the functions
C()b() are assumed to be the same for all individuals
regardless of health status. Indeed, it is common to find
C()b() combined into a single parameter that assumes
contacts to be proportional to the size of the population.
Mixing is also commonly assumed to be homogeneous: i.e.,
P() is assumed to take the form, It/N. We make no special
claims about the value of the S, I, R over other compart-
mental epidemiological models. We use it only to dem-
onstrate an approach that has been applied to many
different models.
In EE models, the time paths of C()b() and P() are
derived from the solution to an economic decision problem
in which individuals seek to meet their goals by choosing,
respectively, the number of contacts they make, precau-
tionary measures that reduce the probability that a contact
will lead to an infection, and/or the effort they commit to
avoiding contact with infectious hosts. One example of C()
allows contact choices to vary with health status, as indi-
viduals in different health classes make different choices
(Fenichel et al. 2011; Fenichel 2013). The contact function
between susceptible and infected individuals takes the
form:
CSIt ðÞ ¼ CSt CIt NðStCSt þ ItCIt þ RtCRt ;
where CS, CI, and CR is a measure of the average number of
contacts an individual in the health classj makes. Another
example derives the contact rate from the individual’s
aversion to disease risk. The number of contacts an indi-
vidual makes is assumed to depend on the exposure, and
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the resulting probability of infection, they are willing to
accept (Aadland et al. 2013). In both variants, the key
implication is that contact choices vary over time, and by
health class, in response to changes in the cost of disease
and disease mitigation arising from changes in the states
S, I, and R. Models that focus on mixing rather than
contact decisions have their roots in the affinity-based
mixing models developed in the 1990s to explore the
consequences of the choice of with whom to mix with,
rather than how much to mix (Dietz and Hadeler 1988;
Busenberg and Castillo-Chavez 1991; Hadeler and Castillo-
Chavez 1995; Morin et al. 2010; Galeotti and Rogers 2013).
In such models, susceptible individuals choose P() rather
than C(), the value of P(St, It, MtSI) depends on the efforts
susceptible individuals make to avoid mixing with infec-
tious individuals. Whether people choose P() or C(), their
choices people depend on the costs and benefits of alter-
native actions. Specifically, people balance the benefits from
making contacts (e.g., the benefits from buying or selling
goods or services) against the costs of disease. They choose
the number of contacts and/or the disease class with whom
to make contact so as to maximize some index of wellbeing
(utility), balancing the benefits of contact against the ex-
pected cost of disease and disease mitigation, conditional
on the current states so that the choices change over time.
The likelihood of becoming infected depends on the
number of contacts made, and the riskiness of those con-
tacts. Typically, the contact choices of a forward-looking











QSjðCSt ; MSIt ; St ; It ; RtÞðVtþ1ðjÞÞ

;
where q is a discount factor; QSj is the probability of
transition from health state S to health state j conditional
on the choice of Ct
S and/or Mt
S, and on the current state of
the system (the health state of others); and Vt+1(j) is the
future value of being in health state j. In solving the
problem, people increase disease risk mitigation up to
the point where the marginal cost of mitigation equals
the state-dependent marginal benefit of reductions in dis-
ease risk.
Because the choices people make change infectious
disease transmission rates, they also change epidemiological
dynamics. It follows that disease dynamics are sensitive
both to the cost of disease (the income forgone during
illness and the direct cost of illness) and the cost of disease
avoidance. If the cost of disease is very low there is little
incentive to avoid it, and disease dynamics will be those
associated with proportionate mixing. If the cost of illness
is very high, people will invest substantial resources in
disease avoidance. In extreme cases, private decisions about
selection of contacts can lead to an effective quarantine on
infected individuals—an effect that would never occur in
classical models. Disease dynamics are also sensitive to the
benefits of contact. People trade-off disease risks against the
benefits of contact. If there is much to be gained from
contact they will accept much greater disease risks than if
there is little to be gained (Areal et al. 2008; Fenichel et al.
2010; Gramig and Horan 2010; Horan et al. 2010).
Improved understanding of the behaviors that influ-
ence disease dynamics improves disease management. It
increases both the number of control options open to
public health authorities, and identifies how much public
intervention is warranted. Depending on people’s goals,
their resources, and the opportunities open to them, the
behavior of some individuals may slow epidemics, while the
behavior of others can speed them up (Kremer 1996;
Aadland et al. 2013). If the private and social costs of dis-
ease and disease avoidance are the same, then the decisions
people make in their own self-interest coincide with the
decisions they would make if they were acting with the
interests of society in mind. If the private and social costs of
disease and disease avoidance are different—if people make
private decisions that are not in the social interest—then
public health authorities can use an understanding of the
private decision process to incentivize people to make
different decisions. In so doing, they can minimize the
expected social cost of the disease and its control.
This opens up a novel set of disease management
instruments aimed at confronting individuals with the
external costs of their actions or compensating them for the
external benefits their actions provide. Specifically, public
health managers may select instruments that change the
course of disease by changing contact and mixing incen-
tives. The same costs of disease and disease avoidance that
drive private contact and mixing decisions become poten-
tial points of leverage on contact and mixing behavior. If
the social decision-maker is able to alter those costs
through, for example, taxes, subsidies, access fees, penalties,
and so on, then the social decision-maker is also able to
change private behavior and disease dynamics (Francis
1997; Auld 2003; Francis 2004). For example, where
tracking mechanisms allow the sale of diseased animals to
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be traced back to a specific hub in the supply chain,
opening the responsible individuals up to legal penalties
provides them with an incentive to exercise care. By
increasing the private payoff to actions that confer benefits
on others, it is possible to enhance the public good even if
individuals act only in their private self-interest (Francis
1997; Sandler and Arce 2002).
EVIDENCE
There are as yet relatively few empirical studies of the
relation between the costs and benefits of contact, the
decisions that people make involving trade or travel con-
tacts, and the spread of either animal or human diseases.
However, those studies that do exist are informative. They
test two of the main hypotheses suggested by theoretical
work on private disease risk mitigation: (a) that efforts to
reduce contact with infected people are likely to be
increasing in the cost of disease and decreasing in the cost
of avoidance, and (b) that disease risk mitigation reduces
disease prevalence and lengthens disease epidemics (Figs. 1,
2) (Chowell et al. 2007, 2009b; Fenichel et al. 2011). Since
the cost of disease avoidance is greater the more difficult it
is to identify infected individuals, the first of these
hypotheses also implies that risk mitigation is likely to be
increasing in the quality of the signals about which indi-
viduals are infected (Fenichel and Horan 2007b).
On the first hypothesis, the effort made to avoid risk, and
so disease prevalence, has been found to be increasing in the
cost of disease (Mummert and Weiss 2013). There is evidence
that people are willing to pay more to avoid diseases they
believe to be serious, and that their willingness to pay changes
as their perception of the seriousness of the disease changes.
A study of the number of passengers missing previously
purchased flights during the 2009 swine flu or A/H1N1
influenza epidemic used flight records, Google Trends and
the World Health Organization’s FluNet data to show that
concern over H1N1 accounted for a small proportion
(0.34%) of missed flights during the epidemic. The authors
estimated that this represented around $50 M in travel-
related benefits. They noted that while this was consistent
with a self-protective response to the epidemic, the timing of
responses correlated poorly with FluNet data. They con-
cluded that responses were motivated by subjective rather
than objective perceptions of risk (Fenichel et al. 2013).
For animal diseases (and emerging zoonoses), it has
been shown that decisions affecting the national and inter-
national movement of livestock reflect the costs and benefits
of disease risk mitigation, and strongly influence the prob-
ability of spread (Keeling et al. 2001; Kilpatrick et al. 2006,
2009). Analyses of the 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD)
outbreak in the UK, and the 2004 H5N1 avian influenza
outbreak in Thailand, for example, show that differences in
the compensation schemes applied in each case had signif-
icant effects on the relative costs of disease and disease
avoidance, and hence on the dynamics of the disease. In the
UK FMD outbreak, the structure of compensation to
farmers perversely reduced the cost of disease and increased
the cost of disease avoidance, so discouraging disease
avoidance (Davies 2002). In the Thailand H5N1 outbreak,
by contrast, the government offered farmers 100% com-
pensation for every animal killed (significantly above the
compensation formally allowed under the Animal Epidemic
Act), effectively reducing the private cost of disease avoid-
ance to zero (Tiensin et al. 2005).
Figure 1. The effect of disease risk
mitigation through selective mix-
ing on disease prevalence and the
duration of an epidemic. Solid lines
show prevalence and duration
where susceptible individuals mix
with other individuals randomly
(proportional mixing). Dashed
lines show prevalence and duration
where susceptible individuals avoid
mixing with infected and infec-
tious individuals (selective mix-
ing).
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Because disease risk reflects both the probability of
infection and the cost of infection, trade growth that re-
duces cost more than proportionately to the increase in the
probability of infection can, paradoxically, reduce risk
(Fenichel and Horan 2007a, b; Fenichel et al. 2010; Horan
et al. 2011, 2013). While there have been no formal tests of
this hypothesis, there is considerable empirical evidence
that people trade-off the price of goods and services against
the risks they pose (Lusk and Coble 2005), just as they
trade-off the rate of return and risk on asset holdings
(Ghysels et al. 2005).
There is less evidence that the public management of
infectious human disease is sensitive to the incentive effects
of changes in the private cost of disease and disease
avoidance. Although the World Health Organization rec-
ognizes the cost effectiveness of economic instruments
(World Health Organization 2004), applications to the
control of infectious human diseases are limited. The most
obvious and long standing examples are the use of subsidies
to lower the private cost of vaccination (Brito et al. 1991;
Geoffard and Philipson 1996, 1997; Cook et al. 2009) or
vaccination and treatment (Gersovitz and Hammer 2004;
Gersovitz 2011). By contrast, standard control measures
such as travel interdictions or enforced quarantine are
classic, and often poorly targeted, examples of command
and control instruments. Measures of this sort have, in
particular cases, proved to be extremely costly (Thompson
et al. 2002; Webby and Webster 2003; Smith et al. 2009b;
Keogh-Brown et al. 2010). In some cases, for example,
mandatory controls have increased the flow of infected
emigrants from the epicenter of infectious disease out-
breaks, so spreading the disease to uninfected sub-popu-
lations (Mesnard and Seabright 2009; Maharaj and
Kleczkowski 2012).
The use of command-and-control instruments is par-
ticularly common at the national level, where governments
have the authority to implement emergency controls on
subject populations (World Health Organization 2006; Stern
and Markel 2009; Steelfisher et al. 2012). Interestingly, it is
also the preferred approach at the international level where
the control options are prescribed by two multilateral
agreements, the International Health Regulations and the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, even though there is
no supranational body with sovereign authority over nation
states (Perrings et al. 2010a, b). While measures of this sort do
not directly target the incentives facing susceptible individ-
uals they do have incentive effects. A study of the 2009 H1N1
epidemic in Mexico, for example, concluded that the pro-
longation of the epidemic through a second wave was
induced by the private response to social distancing measures
implemented by the health authorities (Herrera-Valdez et al.
2011). Similar effects were observed in the 2007 Dengue
outbreak in Taiwan (Hsieh and Chen 2009), and the 2002–
2003 SARS epidemic (Chowell et al. 2004).
Figure 2. The symmetry between
disease risk mitigation through
contact reduction and disease risk
mitigation through selective mix-
ing. The upper panel indicates the
timing and level of optimal contact
reduction by susceptible individu-
als under each strategy (contact
reduction is zero under a selective
mixing strategy). The lower panel
indicates the timing and level of
effort committed by susceptible
individuals to avoiding infected/
infectious individuals under each
strategy (avoidance effort is zero
under a contact reduction strat-
egy).
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The question to consider is whether mandatory mea-
sures are cost effective, once the incentive effects of those
measures are taken into account. The optimal control pro-
gram in all cases depends on a number of factors, including
the nature of disease, the size of each population, the length
of the time horizon, or the discount rate applied, as well as the
characteristics of the controls (Brandeau et al. 2003). This
makes it difficult to generalize. We are unaware of empirical
studies of the relative cost effectiveness of mandatory and
incentive-based measures for the ex post control of outbreaks.
It seems clear, however, that incentive-based measures are
able to reduce the ex ante risk of disease more cost effectively
than direct controls over the mobility of people or the
movement of goods. A study of the cost effectiveness of a
number of different classes of primary disease prevention
(controls aimed at preventing new cases of disease) found
that that measures aimed at changing the environment
within which people make decisions are significantly more
cost-effective than measures aimed at clinical or nonclinical
interventions on individuals (Chokshi and Farley 2012).
Measures aimed at changing the environment within which
people make decisions include, for example, taxes designed
to increase the private cost of risky behaviors. Measures
aimed at individuals include, for example, quarantine or
screening programs. The study showed that in terms of costs
per quality-adjusted life-year the proportion of preventive
measures that are cost saving is higher among environmental
interventions (46%) than among clinical interventions
(16%) or nonclinical, person-directed interventions (13%).
Given that individual restrictions or obligations also pose
more legal and ethical challenges (National Research Council
2007), this indicates that incentive-based measures may offer
a significant advantage.
For plant diseases, a recent example of the use of
incentives, in the form of conditional market access, con-
cerns management of disease risk associated with interna-
tional plant trade. With a 2011 amendment to the Plant
Protection Act, the USDA established a new ‘‘gray list’’
designation available for plants known as ‘‘Not Approved
Pending a Pest Risk Analysis’’ (NAPPRA) for species that
might be pests, or serve as hosts of pests or pathogens (US
Department of Agriculture-Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service 2011). This rule change made it simpler
to restrict access to US markets for particular taxa of plants
which pose a biological risk (Liebhold et al. 2012). Cur-
rently, the only mechanism for approving NAPPRA listings
for importation is a detailed pest risk assessment (PRA)
assessing the threat of pest infestation, transit, colonization,
spread, and damage. In April 2013, the USDA formally
proposed a further amendment that would allow US
import market access for NAPPRA listings conditional on
exporters’ adoption of Integrated Pest Risk Management
Measures (IPRMM) (US Department of Agriculture-Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2013). IPRMM
involves certification that sufficient phytosanitary measures
are being applied from the beginning of production to the
end of distribution. Market access in an IPRMM program
would be particularly flexible and dynamic. Access for ap-
proved producers could be revoked if the producer failed to
meet the conditions at any time (US Department of Agri-
culture-Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2013).
While the US is at the forefront of the IPRMM approach,
interest is global. In 2012 parties to the International Plant
Protection Convention adopted a standard known as
ISPM-36 which recommended and outlined the use of
integrated measures to manage pest and pathogen host risk
for international plant trade (International Plant Protection
Convention 2012). Attempts to bring pathogen introduc-
tion risks into the Fish and Wildlife Service injurious spe-
cies regulations are an effort to follow this, but so far have
not been successful.
DISCUSSION
In some spheres of environmental management, com-
mand-and-control instruments are being replaced, or at
least supplemented, by economic instruments designed to
penalize those whose actions harm others (Stavins 2003) or
to incentivize those whose actions benefit others (Kinzig
et al. 2011). There are many such instruments already in
use for managing invasive pests and pathogens. They in-
clude charges covering the cost of inspection and inter-
ception, excise taxes, environmental bonds, damage bonds,
import deposits, restoration deposits, ballast water fees, and
tradable risk permits (Eisworth and Johnson 2002; Horan
et al. 2002; Olson 2006; Emerton and Howard 2008; Gren
2008). A number of these instruments also reverse the
burden of proof, in that they require those whose actions
are a source of risk to insure society against the conse-
quences of their actions (Perrings et al. 2002; Keller and
Perrings 2011; Barbier et al. 2013).
The potential for the use of market-based mechanisms
(taxes) to correct the external costs that infected individuals
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impose on society in the course of an epidemic has already
been demonstrated in simulation models (Goldman and
Lightwood 2002; Gersovitz and Hammer 2004, 2005).
Similar results have been found for the use of subsidies on
the cost of vaccines (Francis 2004; Chen 2006). There is,
however, scope for reducing the cost of disease avoidance
in other ways. Measures that reduce the income loss from
private disease avoidance, for example, can be particularly
effective. Just as regulations governing physical safety in the
workplace have reduced the incidence of work-related
accidents, so rights to paid sick leave can reduce infectious
disease risks (Aronsson et al. 2000; Ska˚tun 2003).
Given the pressure on public health authorities to
develop more targeted and cost effective disease manage-
ment strategies (Glass et al. 2006; Fenichel 2013), incentive-
based disease prevention programs are increasingly attrac-
tive options. The CDC’s current HIV prevention program,
for example, is focused on risk targeting, bringing a geo-
graphic specificity to prevention policies, and developing a
rank ordering of policies by cost effectiveness (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2009). The plan explicitly
aims to ‘‘Identify, develop and evaluate effective behavioral
interventions and strategies’’ (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2011). This requires measuring variables at
scales that allow prioritization of funding across locations
and risk categories. It is recognized that where the preva-
lence of disease is low, people will not take as much care to
limit their exposure as they do where prevalence is high,
making disease eradication problematic (Aadland et al.
2013). By encouraging private individuals to make deci-
sions that are in the social interest, incentive-based mea-
sures can counteract effects of this kind.
One other implication of the EE approach is that the
measures used to monitor and predict disease risk can be
broadened. In addition to prevalence measures, it becomes
possible to use measures of disease risk mitigation or the
drivers of disease risk mitigation. Aside from the travel data
used in the H1N1 study, for example, it is possible to
employ time use surveys (Zagheni et al. 2008) and home
media consumption measurement by audience research
firms. These have the appealing feature that a representative
sample of residents is monitored continuously over time
and in a consistent way across a large set of countries.
Coincident with an outbreak, deviations in television
viewership, for example, can provide a proxy for assessing
changes in time spent at home and thus in social contacts.
It is also possible to exploit the much larger data base on
avoidance behavior to other sources of human health risk
such as air pollution and drinking water contamination
(Zivin and Neidell 2013). Beyond such measures, data on
prices, sales, employment, output, exports, and imports
may be as valuable for predicting epidemics as data on
current disease status (Suhrcke et al. 2011).
In summary, the EE approach is opening up new op-
tions for both the prediction and management of epidemics.
By improving our understanding of contact behavior the
approach is strengthening capacity to project the future
course of disease. By identifying the gap between the private
and social cost of private disease risk mitigation, the EE
approach makes it possible to induce people to behave in
ways that are consistent with the public good. That is, it
helps to identify both the private choices that best serve the
public interest, and the incentives needed to lead people to
make those choices. This opens up the prospect of more
cost-effective disease control. Many governments are already
committed to subsidizing vaccines. Many also use penalties
to discourage importation of infected animals or plants.
There is, however, scope for making more and better-
informed use of instruments of this kind in the future.
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